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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.
CASE NO.
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WATSON, State Engineer of the State
of Utah,
Defendants and Respondents ,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURl/£ ON REPLY OF STATE
ENGINEER AND REPLY OF RESPONDENT JONES

FISHER HARRIS
Amicus Curiae

(All italics or other indications of emphasis are ours)

Briefs in answer to that of Amicus Curire have now been
filed by Respondents, and this is our reply. We think it proper
to so designate it, for, though filed subsequent to the briefs
of the parties, our first was in the nature of an original brief
in the cause on appeal, and raised and discussed only those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
matters already raised by Appellant. It is true, however, that
those matters were substantially elaborated and that they were
presented in somewhat different light. It was therefore proper
we think, but without offering our opinion as of any consequence, that Respondents were afforded opportunity to answer.
That we should now reply seems equally appropriate; not only
because of our situation relative to the cause, but also because
of our relation as Amicus Curire, which we trust we shall not
forget.
Respondents have devoted considerable space and effort
toward the limitation and definition of our ((role and status."
(Motion of Respondents as to Amicus Curire and Reply of
Respondent Jones, pages 7 and 9). It is said that we have presented ((numerous new and controverted matters, both of law
and fact''; that we purport to ((represent Provo River Water
Users Association, but speak also for the United States, the
Public Interest, and also for other parties including the parties
to this action.'' They ask by the motion to ((be advised as to
whether a new party has been now injected and is now being
represented", and, in the Reply of Respondent Jones, urge
that Provo River Water Users Association' cannot become a
party by reason of the fact that its Counsel has appeared as
Amicus Curire. ((Amicus Curire is restricted," it is said, uto
suggestions relative to matters apparent on the record or to
matters of practice. His principal function is to aid the Court
on questions of law."
With this last, we are in perfect accord. The Respondent
objects to Provo River Water Users' Association becoming or
being considered as a party, and it accedes to the objection;
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the objection is well, though quite unnecessarily, taken; and
,ve shall endeavor to assist the court to the best of our ability.
As to the Hnumerous new and controverted matters, both
of law and fact" presented by us: The Court may recall that at
the oral argument Respondents were challenged to ((name
one .. , but that none were. There are none. We have insisted
from the outset, and still do, that there is, and since the filing of
the Jones applications, there never has been but one issue,
viz: Have the statutory prerequisites to their approval been
satisfied? The answer to the question depends, of course,
upon the record made before the trial court; depends, of course,
upon what is explicitly and implicitly in the record and upon
the legal effects resulting-resulting as either immediately
decisive of the ultimate issue or in effects upon which that
issue in turn depends.
As for whom we speak: We happen to be Counsel for
the Provo River Water Users Association, and, except for
that fact, it is improbable that we should have noticed the case
of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones and Ed. H. Watson,
State Engineer, or, if noticed, that we should .have been
troubled by its possibilities. But however that may be, we
have noticed it, and we have been and are troubed by its possibilities; but our motivation is of no consequence. What may
be of consequence is the validity of our analysis and reasoning,
which, in result, is something quite impersonal. It is true as
charged that we speak for the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, and for the Public Interest as
well. In our original brief we have expressed them interchangeably, regarding them, as we do, as practically identical
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in their relation to this appeal. Nevertheless, what we have
already said, and what we shall say, might as well have
emanated from any other, .for all of it is in support of the
proposition that on the record no case for the approval of the
Jones applications was made in the Court below-something
which may properly be affirmed at any time and by anyone.
As we put it in our original brief (pages 6-7):
·'That no cause of action has been stated or, if stated,
that none has been made by the evidence, may be brought to
attention at any time, and the court may notice the fact in
either case and act accordingly though it was not noticed or
mentioned by parties or counsel; and no court would close its
mind to these matters merely because reminded of them by a
defeated litigant, or even by a stranger."
It seems not altogether impossible that the difference
between Respondents and Amicus Curire is wider in respect
of the proposition just stated than it is as to the merits. This
very clearly appears from Respondent's original brief (page 6)
under ((I. The point now presented is that Appellant cannot
here for the first time raise the claim briefed"; and again from
the Reply (Jones, page 11) :
but this is a private suit by one protestant and
appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by the appropriations
sought."
C(

•

•

•

And still again (page 13):
''In this case we had only to meet the claim, as alleged,
of Appellant's diligence right. The trial court had only to
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determine whether that clain1 required the Engineer to reject
the application."
·· This vie'vv that the case of Lehi Irrigation Company vs.
Jones and Ed. H. Watson, State Engineer and others of its
kind (all cases, for that matter) are private debates, to be
decided on the basis of an oratorical contest, pervades the
briefs of Respondent Jones. That they are regarded as involving no public interest is perfectly evident from the brief of
the Special Assistant Attorney General (pages 3 and 9) :
. . . it appeared by the pleadings simply to be a private
dispute between two water users ... "
··This case was presented to the State Enginee~ as a private
dispute ... "
This in face of the provisions of Chapter 3, Title 100,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943-among others impelling an
opposite view, that in the interest of the State and the administration of its water policies the State Engineer is not only· a
proper but an indispensable party to the trial de novo in the
District Court.
Entirely aside, however, from the public aspect of the
matter before the Engineer or the trial court: Whatever it
may be that the statute requires to exist as prerequisites to
the approval of an application, those prerequisites must be
found by one or the other. They must be found to exist within
that degree of certainty and within that extent of finality
determined by this court as satisfying the expressed intent of
the legislature; and if they are not found within those limits,
no case for approval has been made, and the statute, as well
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as basic principles. of la\v, requue that an application be
rejected.
In this view there is no sense in talking of the bringing
in of new parties or in citing authorities to the effect that the
interest of one not a party to a cause cannot be foreclosed by
its result as between those who are parties. Neither is it at
all helpful or relevant to multiply cases that the State Engineer
is not a judicial officer and hence cannot adjudicate relative
rights. So far as we know, no one claims or believes that he
can. Respondents attribute such belief to us, but that is no
more than one of a multitude of ccstraw men" held up to the
court.
To say, however, that new parties may not be brought
into a cause as parties, by testimony or findings, is not to say
that attention may not thus be directed to them, or that, having
been thus noticed, they may not be the objects of judicial
solicitude, or even that the fact of the interest of one not a
party may not be decisive against the claim of one who is.
Suppose, for example, that in the instant case all the testimony
had been that all the waters in question had been appropriated
pursuant to all the requirements of law by the famous John
Smith, and all were being put to beneficial use by him from
one year's end to the other.
And to say that the interest of one not a party cannot
be foreclosed by its result as between the parties, is quite
different from a statement that his interest cannot be affected.
For example, the Whitmore of Whitmore vs. Murray City,
107 Utah 445, was not a party to the proceeding before the
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State Engineer in response to which Murray City was granted
the :right, as bet,veen it and the State, to move a point of
diversion up stream. This Court held and declared in unequivocal terms that his rights relative to those of the City had
not been foreclosed by the decision of the Engineer. But
who will say they were not affected, or that they ought not
to have been considered by the Engineers as decisively militating
against the granting of Murray's application? Whitmore's
rights were not foreclosed by the action of the State Engineer,
but that action inevitably subjected him to trouble and anxiety
and expense, and to the unfortunately unavoidable hazards
of litigation which in the lower court went against him.
True also that the State Engineer is an administrative
officer and cannot make any final ajudication of relative rights
either of parties before him or of others. This court has said
so sufficiently often, and has even so decided clearly enough
to convince the most reluctant. But it doesn't follow from
this, as seems to be supposed by Respondents, that the Engineer
is not, or that a trial court on appeal fro!Jl him is not, under
obligation to examine and to make findings and decisions with
consequences no different as to the matter before him than if
he were a judicial officer and the parties affected were before
him as the result of due process. The matter before him
in common instance, and the matter before a trial court on
appeal from him, is an application ((to acquire the right to
the use of . . . unappropriated public water", and his :finding
and his decision accordingly, that there is or is not ((unappropriated water in the proposed source" and that nthe proposed
use will" or will Hnot impair existing rights", etc., is as final
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and conclusive as to that nzatter as the finding and decision of
any court from which there is right of appeal. If the application is approved ((the applicant shall be authorized, on receipt
thereof, to proceed with the construction of the necessary
works and take all steps required to apply the water to the
use named in the application and to perfect the propos,ed
appropriation"; but ((if the application is rejected, the applicant
shall take no steps toward the prosecution of the proposed
work or the diversion and use of the public water so long as
such rejection shall continue in force", (Section 10, Chapter
3, Title 100, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) and, in the absence
of appeal to the courts, that is the end of that.
Fugitive expressions of this Court, misapplied and stripped
of their context1 have lent color to the opinion that the office
of State Engineer is little if anything more than one of record;
that his obligations are otherwise perfunctory, and hence that
the common practice of disclaimer in actions to which he is
a party is entirely consistent with his official character. So
also have they led to statements such as the following from
the brief (pages 5-6 and elsewhere) of the Special Assistant
Attorney General, and to similar statements in the original
Respondent's brief to which he was a party.
c]t is only where there is no probability that the
application might be perfected that the State Engineer
should deny the application. Such was the holding of
the court in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. vs. Kents Lake
Res .. Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108. See Little Cottonwood v. Kimball, supra; Eardley V. Terry, supra".
Such was not the holding of the Court in any of the cases
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cited; neither is it the holding of any other case decided by the
Supreme Court of Utah. If time will permit, we expect to
demonstrate the validity of this statement of ours, and the
careless inaccuracy of that quoted in1mediately above, as well
as the following (Page 6 and elsewhere) :
((The State Engineer should examine the application
to ascertain the declared intent and, if there is any reasonable probability to believe (sic) that a right might be
perfected, the State Engineer has been told by this Court
that he should approve the application."
We regret the necessity of this rather long introduction
to the principal immediate purpose of this brief-a careful
examination of the decisions of this court in relation to the
duties of the State Engineer in rejecting or approving an
application made .. For the purpose of acquiring the right to
use a portion of the unappropriated water of the State of
Utah." But, looking again at the Reply briefs, we are confirmed as to its necessity, and as to the necessity of still more,
for never before have we seen such effort to avoid, so many
((straw men" created and demolished, or so much within
quotations marks that is not quotation.
It is not suggested that these things are of intrinsic importance. Most of them are not; a few may J?e. All, however,
are entanglements or obstacles in the way of the clear view
which we hope to present.
We quote first from pages 3 and 9 of the Reply of the
Special Assistant Attorney General:
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... It appeared by the pleadings simply to be a private
dispute between two water users over the right to use waters
then running to waste/'
rrAt the time of the dispute the waters were running to
waste." Now there isn't a scrap of evidence proving, tending
to prove, or offered for the purpose of proving, that the
((waters were running to waste." The State Engineer found
as the applications allege, that they were tributary to Utah
Lake. ··A more serious question is raised by the fact that these
waters are tributary to Utah Lake." The trial court found the
same thing in finding Jones' land adjacent to Dry Creek, and
that the drainage after use was into it. (Findings of Fact
Nos. 5 and 6.)

Next from page 4 of the same brief:
((The State Engineer thinks it would be unfortunate if
the issues raised by the Amicus Curire were to be decided upon
their merits here.''
In the first place, the State Engineer thinks nothing of
the sort. He knows nothing at all of the case. The unfortunate
fact is that, though the State Engineer knew, both personally
and officially, of the claims and rights of the United States
and the Provo River Water Users Association, the Special
Assistant Attorney General either did not know or forgot about
them. We take it, however, that the views of the State Engineer, if he had any, will not be quite decisive as to what
issues this Court will decide. That same brief contains a
number of the Court ·~ought" to do this, and the Court nought"
to do that.
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In the state of the confusion we are seeking to order and
quiet, it is necessary to 'nlake son1e further comn1ent upon
this attempt at avoidance. The issue raised by Amicus Curire
in no real sense is raised by him at all. It is the statute that
raises the issue. It is the elementary and fundamental rule
of law that raises it. We merely notice and call attention to
it. If in urging that the issues should not ((be decided on
their merits here" is meant that this court ought not to make
a final adjudication on the merits of the rights of the United
States and the Provo River Water Users Association, we agree.
No more should a final adjudication on the merits be made -in
this than in any other case by the State Engineer or, on appeal
from his decision, by the District Court. On the other hand
-no less. In every case in which application is made ((to
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated public
water in this state" the Engineer is required to determine that
there is or is not ((unappropriated water in the proposed source"
and whether "the proposed use will" or will nnot impair existing
rights." It is the statute (Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100,
Utah Code Annotated 1943) that requires him to make such
determination. Of unavoidable necessity his determination
must be based upon the supply of the source and the nature
and extent of the already existing rights to utilize it. To urge
as does the Reply Brief above and as it does at greater length
elsewhere (pages 13-14) is to argue that the Engineer's determination can be only one

way~

To paraphrase: "An appli-

cation may be approved, because that result involves no
adjudication of relative rights; but it may not be rejected
because it does.''
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To continue: Reply of Respondent Jones, page 5:
"Certainly, neither of these objecting parties can appropriate his (Jones) property for swamp storage of their water,
if any they have."
No one wants to. Neither the United States nor the Provo
River Water Users Association has the slightest objection to
the drainage from the Jones' lands of the waters they are
entitled to use. On the contrary, the drainage of the Jones
swamp is precisely what they wish. It is interference with
the free flow of "Deer Creelt waters into Dry Creek and
thence into Utah Lake to which they object.
Jones Reply, pages 5-6:
"In our first brief, we supported by direct authorities, three propositions. These were:
1. That the issue raised on appeal as to Government filings on the Weber River could not, \vith any
pleadings below, be raised for the first time on argument here.
2. That the objection based on possible claims
by a third party stranger to the action, is not available
to appellant here.
3. That on the merits, appellant's cairns,
whether arising under this or under its diligent creek
right, as pleaded, did not justify rejection of these
applications.
((Amicus Curire supports our statement that the
issue was not raised by the pleadings below, and appellant makes no reply and no contention that it was.
On the claim that was pleaded by it below, Amicus
Curire says that it is (conceded by appellant' that the
waters claimed have not been appropriated by it.
( A.4) ; that it was established that appellant had no
C<

0

0

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

right ( .:\..5); and refers to it later as ~a defeated litigant' (A.7).
((Our second point, as briefed and supported, is
not contested at all, and the authorities cited ( 0. 8-12)
are not challenged. These seem to entitle respondent
to an affirmance of the judgtnent here.
''The third point, on the merits as it relates to
the appellant having no right to object to the approvals under its claim, as pleaded, is not questioned
by it, and is endorsed and enforced by amicus curire.''
Here we have a something· indeed. All of Respondent's
propositions nsupported by direct authorities" have either been
expressly admitted, have not been contested, or have been
tcendorsed and enforced" by us. Were it not for the austerity
of the court we should reply to this with a simple and appropriate expletive________________ ! As it is, however, we are restrained
to something more nearly classical, by Macaulay. ((A wise man
might talk folly like this at his fireside; but that any human
being, after having made such a joke, should write it down,
and copy it out, and transmit it to the printer, and correct the
proof sheets, and send it forth into the world, is enough to
make us ashamed of our species."
The complaint on appeal from the State Engineer alleged
(Par. 5):
'' 5. That plaintiff further alleges that there are no unappropriated waters arising from springs or spring areas
tributary to said Dry Creek, within the areas as claimed by the
defendant, Clarence T. Jones, or otherwise, and that the whole
of said waters within said areas have been, and now are being
put to a beneficial use by plaintiff here~'
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This seems amply sufficient to ratse the issue of ((unappropriated water in the proposed source.
But ·sufficient
or not as to that, the case before the District Court is that
which was before the State Engineer. It is to be tried de novo,
and the issues are those made by the statute. But "since
attention is directed to the pleadings, we notice that the answer
of Respondent Jones contains no allegations of unappropriated
water in the proposed source or that the proposed use will
not impair existing rights. Not~ing, however, can be made of
that, because the sole purpose of the so-called ((complaint" is
to bring the application before the District Court, which
determines on trial de novo precisely those issues made by
the statute and in the first instance determined by the State
Engineer. Eardley vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367.
The principal effort of Respondent Jones is one in avoidance .. The rights of Lehi Irrigation Company are not affected
by approval of the application, and that is the end of the
matter; never mind the statute. That is the sum of Respondent's
contentions. (( . . . but this is a private suit by one protestant
and appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by the appropriations sought. No one but the parties hereto is, or can be,
affected by this law suit and it must be decided upon the claims
and record made by the parties hereto" (Jones Reply, page
11) ; and (we add in paraphrase) nthe decision must go to the
winner of the debate between them, no matter how deficient
that record may be. The statute has nothing to do with it."
Our answer is that the prerequisites to the approval of the
Jones applications were not affected by the protest of Lehi
ltrigatio'n Company. It is usually, though not always, easier
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

to obtain judgment on default, but the prerequisites to judgment
do not increase or diminish in ratio to the number of contestants or the intensity of opposition. An application for
right to use water is addressed to the State of Utah, acting by
its State Engineer, and is to be rejected or approved by him
in response to the obligations devolving from act of the
legisJature. As a practical matter, Lehi Irrigation Company
may not have received it, but it and its rights would have been
entitled to the same consideration had it not appeared before
the Engineer, or, the applications having been brought before
the Court, had it not been a party there.
It is not uncommon that the State Engineer ·is the sole
party, in form defendant, on appeal from his decision. Suppose
the Jones applications had been denied without protest by or
knowledge of them by Lehi Irrigation Company; that Jones
had appealed, and, on the trial de novo before the District
Court, the waters had been found to be and always to have
been tributary to Dry Creek the entire flow of which Lehi
Irrigation Company was entitled to use, and for those reasons
the court had held the application properly denied. Would
Jones be heard here--for long-to urge that a second party
had improperly been brought into the case; or would he receive
serious attention if he argued that the rights of the Irrigation
Company had not been pleaded, and so must be ignored; or
that the application ought to have been approved anyway,
because approval is always ccsubject to prior rights"; and because
"an application is not an appropriation"; and because .the State
Engineer "has no judicial power" and the District Court on
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appeal..f~om

him cannot adjudicate water rights?!!! ··(Let 'em

sue me.''
Here is another Straw Man (Jones Reply, page 10):
CCThe brief erroneously assumes that the approval of
these applications (subject to prior rights', will have some
far reaching or destructive effect upon the whole plan of
reclamation in the State. That water rights are thereby
adjudicated or concluded."
((The Brief" assumes none of that, and no one can reasonably assert that it does. Approval would confer the right to
((take all steps required to apply the water to the use named
in the application and to perfect the proposed appropriation."
The statute (Section 10, Chapter 3, Title 100) says so. To
acquire the right to do that is the very purpose and necessity
of the application. The doing of that which would be authorized would prevent the water from reaching the place at which
it is to be stored and measured. It would be inconsistent with
and would C(impair existing rights" of the United States and
the Provo River Water Users Association. Surely, we think,
it is no sufficient or proper answer that they may have recourse
to litigation. Aside from that, however, it is certain that the
claim, or the fact, if it were such, that ((no one will be hurt"
is not sufficient answer to the allegation that there has been
a failure of proof.
Here is another plea in abatement (Jones Reply,
page 14): ((As further indicating the great number of
questions that may be raised if the court were to attempt
to litigate the alleged claims, as suggested by Amicus
. ... ''
Curtre
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Who ever suggested that this court litigate. any claims! So
far as the rights,of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River
Project are concerned, Respondent has already ''litigated"
them in the sense of having established the fact of their
existence.
Another Straw (Jones Reply page 17):
''Another matter of misconception in this connection 1s
the reference to the language in the quoted statutes (A.
10) as to 'unappropriated water in the proposed source.'
(Jones' italics) From this, it is argued that the 'proposed
source' here is Weber River.''
It is not so argued, either {(from this" or otherwise, and to
assert that it is, is strangely unreasonable.
And still another (Jones Reply, page 22):
" ... it is confidently asserted that the United States does
intend to reclaim this seepage, apparently directly. And,
if this is true, then, of course, to reclaim it on the lands
of every farmer where seepage may appear from increased
irrigation.''
It is confidently asserted that the United States intends
to reclaim this seepage. It is asserted with that degree of
confidence naturally resulting from knowledge of a fact well
known as such to everyone who knows anything of the Provo
River Project. It is a fact of public notoriety. It is a fact
known in more intimate relationship by the users of water from
Utah Lake and their several counsel. It is, of course, not
true, nor is it ccapparently" true that the seepage is to be
reclaimed "directly" non the lands of every farmer ·where
seepage may appear from increased irrigation." But even if
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

recovery of the seepage could not be accomplished except as
Respondent says \ve say is intended, what of that? Practical difficulty of perfecting an appropriation is no ground for denial of
the right to do so. Some of the cases cited by him are clear to
that effect-the often cited Little Cottonwood Water Company
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, among others.
We might go on and on with these, for there are many~
many more of the same sort; but time presses, and so we will
close this part of our brief with statement of a curious fact.
The Jones Reply purports to give several excerpts from our
original brief, but few of them are entitled to quotation marks.
Even quotation of the statute is not accurate in every instance.
It is our hope that sufficient time will be available to permit
a brief and analysis of all the cases cited by Respondents.
Those, with a few in addition, we believe will include most,
and perhaps all, of the decisions of this court defining the
obligations of the State Engineer in relation to an application
addressed to him ''for the purpose of acquiring the right to
use a portion of the unappropriated water of the State of Utah."
It occurs to us, however, that counsel, engrossed in their own
business, too often forget that it is no more than a very small
part of that imposed upon the court. Mindful of that tendency
and the court's burden of many other cases, we shall re-state
the essential facts and issues to which the decisions to be
reviewed are applicable, and, although that may sufficiently
appear from what has been said above, we shall also re-state
the contentions of counsel for all parties and our own as
.
.
amucts cunre.
Three applications of Respondent Jones for right to use
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unappropriated water were brought before the Fourth Judicial
District Court by appeal from the decision of the State Engineer.
Upon the trial de novo the actions were consolidated. The
\Vaters involved were those uarising from springs and spring
areas upon the lands" (Finding 5) of the applicant (tduring
approximately the last three years." (Finding 7). · (The
findings are dated January 30, 1948) . They would naturally
drain into Dry Creek, a tributary of Utah Lake (Findings 4
and 5 and the applications themselves) . They are waters
((from increased flow in a spring and spring area: due to increased seepage from an enlarged canal and extensive increased
irrigation at higher levels from waters stored at Deer Creek
Rservoir on the Provo River, and which. waters so used and so
seeping and arising in defendant's land are substantially all
waters diverted from the Weber River Irrigation System to
the Provo River and to Deer Creek Reservoir." (Finding 6).
To this we add the following from our original brief
(pages 8 and 9):
'(Those facts, supplemented and explained by something additional, are the basis of the conflicting claims
of the parties. They have been enlarged upon by the
supplying of a context in explanation of the expressions
(tan enlarged canal," ((Deer Creek Reservoir," "waters
diverted from Weber River System to the Provo River and
to Deer Creek Reservoir.''
The result of the enlargement is such that the facts
the effect of which is to be determined are these:
Long before the appearance of the waters in question
in the spring and spring area mentioned in Finding No.
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6, the United States acting through its Bureau of Reclamation had acquired the right to divert water from the
Weber River system, transport it to the Provo River, store
it in a reservoir constructed by the United States known
as ((Deer Creek Reservoir," and distribute it from there
for irrigation and domestic use upon lands and to communities in Utah and Salt Lake counties. The project is
popularly known as the ((Deer Creek Project." It is being
constructed by the United States for the immediate benefit
of and under contract with the Provo River Water Users
Association. The project plan includes ((an enlarged
canal," the enlargement of the Provo Reservoir Canal, and
the distribution through it of a part of the project water
brought from the Weber River and stored in the reservoir
on the Provo.
The rights of the United States have been exercised,
and that part of the project plan just mentioned has been
carried out; it has diverted water from the Weber River
system, has transported it to the Provo River, has stored
it in Deer Creek Reservoir, has enlarged the Provo
Reservoir Canal and through it has distributed a part of
the stored water upon lands at higher levels than the lands
of Respondent Jones. It is as the result of all this that
the waters sought to be appropriated by Jones have accrued
to the ((spring and spring area" mentioned in the finding.
If the context of the expressions of Finding No. 6
were of decisive import under pleadings essential to the
cause, it might be said that, aside from facts proper to
be judicially noticed, it had not been supplied. But there
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is no issue of that nature. Instead it is plain from the
record as well as from the briefs of counsel that references
to and discussion of the Deer Creek Project, the Deer
Creek Reservoir, the Project water rights (except as to
one matter of interpretation) and the Reclamation project
generally of which they are all a part were taken by
counsel and by the trial court as matter of course, as
requiring no proof, as within the knowledge and understanding of all concerned. It is our opinion that the
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation-both the Deer Creek and Aqueduct Divisions-its principal physical features, its scope, its basic
outline and plan-is judicially known. But in the brief
statement of fact above we need not rely upon that____ but
we take it that we may rely upon the context of facts found
to be such, at least to the extent it has been supplied by
both court and counsel."
Every other statement made by us has been the object of
critical comment either in the C(Reply of State Engineer to
Brief of Amicus Curire" or in C(Reply of Respondent Jones
To Amicus Curire Brief," but that just quoted is not questioned.
On the contrary, the Reply said to be that of the State Engineer
assumes the facts to be as we now and originally stated them,
while that of Respondent Jones questioning at length (pages
18-21) our stand that the nDeer Creek Project" is Judicially

known, as well as everything else, makes no mention of this.
Those, then, are the facts, settled and agreed upon as effectually
as upon an agreed statement.
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Our conclusions from the facts was originally (pages 1213) and is now stated in the following language:
ttNow it seems clear to us that Respondent, so far
from having sustained the burden of showing any facti
in response to which he may nacquire the right to the use
of any unappropriateed public water in this state,'' and
that ttthere is unappropriated water in the proposed
source,'' has established the very opposite, that th~re is
none. Appellant alleged that there was no ((unappropriated water in the proposed source" because it had
already been appropriated by Lehi Irrigation Company,
and Respondent, in order to disprove this, established
that there was no ttunappropriated water in the proposed
source" because, not Lehi Irrigation Company, but the
United States had already appropriated the waters the
subject of the application for the benefit of the Deer Creek
Division of the Provo River Project."
Respondents answer this and the conclusion of the same
effect urged by Appellant, by calling attention to the fact (and
it is) that Appellant did not so much as mention the Provo
River Water Users' Association or the United States in the
<(Complaint and Application for Review" by which the propriety of granting or rejecting the Applications was brought
for trial de novo before the Fourth District Court. The issue,
and the only issue, to be decided at that trial, he contends, was
that made by the claim of Lehi Irrigation Company that the
waters the subject of the Applications had been appropriated
by it. The effect of regarding any rights of Provo River Water
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Users' Association, he urges, is to interject a third party into
a private controversy between Jones on one side and Lehi
Irrigation Company on the other. That is to say, as Respondents' original and Reply briefs so often do, uthis is a
private law suit between two small water users" and is of no
concern to any one else. Also, even if the United States and the
Provo River Water Users' Association have prior rights to the
use of the water in question, the application should nevertheless be approved because all approvals are expressly subject
to prior rights, and, in any event, an application is not an
appropriation, and its its approval cannot be inconsistent with
existing rights. The result of it may be, but in such case recourse
may be had to the courts. Again, the waters were going to
waste, anyway, and so were open to appropriation.
And still again, in order to give effect to any rights the
United States may have would require an adjudication of
\vater rights, and the State Engineer having no judicial powers
may not accomplish that. Finally, the showing of the rights of
the United States to the use of the waters in question is not
inconsistent with approval of the applications because, whether
those rights derive from its approved Weber River applications
or from its approved Application No. 12144, they are both
no more than applications, and an application isn't an appro~
priation. The result is that the establishment of those rights
does not establish that there is no ··unappropriated water in
the proposed source~
Those two paragraphs state, we think, every single contention made by Respondents, and we believe they state each of
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them as fully and fairly and as clearly as they have been by
Respondents themselves. All of them have been answered in
our original brief and have been and will be again in this.
The contention that this is a private controversy, limited
in its scope to determinations of the relative rights of the applicant and the person who brought the application before the District court, and hence that the interests and rights of no others
may be considered, is something which, in view of the statute and
the nature of the proceeding, we are compelled to regard as
utterly and obviously frivolous, and, in a sense, unworthy.
So also is that which seeks to exclude consideration of the
rights of others on the ground that to do so involves a judicial
determination of those rights. It might as well (or as ill) be
argued that for such reason, no regard can properly be given
to the rights of the person who brought the Application before
the court, or for that matter, who has appeared before the State
Engineer. As to an approval being subject to prior rights,
that is merely in accentuation of the fact that, while the
Engineer is expressly charged with the duty to make a determination, his determination is not final in the sense that one actually injured by it may not bring it in question by appropriate
action in -the courts. As to an applications not being an appropriation: neither is a Certificate of Appropriation or a Decree.
All of them, however, authorize an appropriation. As to the
waters running to waste: it might as well be said that all waters
up stream from points of diversi~n .or storage are running to
waste.
We have noticed before, and shall probably again call
attention to the fact that the major, almost the entire, effort
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of Respondents is directed to an avoidance of a decision on
the merits-not a final decision on the tnerits of any vested or
claimed to be vested water rights, but a decision as to merit of
our contention that Respondent Jones has made no case for
the approval of his applications; that, so far from satisfying
the requirements of Section 8 of Chapter 3 of Title 100 Utah
Code Annotated, he has established affirmatively that those
requirements have not been satisfied.
Now, however, we shall brief and analyze the cases cited
by Respondents and seek to determine, as best we can, their
application to the facts, as well as to the several results
claimed by Respondents to follow from them.
Sowards vs. Meagher, 37 Utah 212
"The appellants, plaintiffs below, filed an application with
the state engineer for the appropriation of waters of the East
fork of Lake fork of Green river. By reason of such application,
they claim to have initiated a right to the use of three hundred
second feet of water of such stream for irrigation purposes.
Upon a protest filed for the respondents, the defendants below,
who also filed applications for an appropriation of the same
waters, plaintiffs' application was rejected and the respondents'
approved by the state engineer. The plaintiffs then brought
this action in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
against the defe,ndants to adjudicate the questions involved."
The application of Plaintiff appellants were filed with the
State Engineer subsequent to those of Defendant Respondents.
They were ((rejected by the state engineer on the sole ground
that their application is in conflict U'ith prior applications'' of
Defendant Respondents.
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Appellant contended that their application, though filed
after those of Respondents, ought not to have been rejected,
because '' all of said water applied for" by Respondents "and
the lands proposed to be irrigated'' by them were within an
Indian Reservation not yet open to entry when their applications
were filed, and so that the State of Utah had no jurisdiction over
the waters or the lands, and hence the applications were void.
It was held by this court "that unappropriated public water
on a reservation or on the public domain is subject to appropriation, and may be appropriated for a beneficial purpose,
though the appropriator has not, when his application is filed
with the state engineer,' a present right in or to the lands along ·
the stream from which the water is proposed to be diverted, or
in or to the lands proposed to be irrigated by him.''
The opinion precedes this by several pages and follov{s it
with seven; but the paragraph just quoted is all that was decided.
This case is cited by the Special Assistant Attorney General as follows:

(Reply page 6) "In Sowards vs. Meagher

the Court held that an application to appropriate was
nothing more than a "preliminary notice of intent." Something like that was ''said,'' but it was not ''held.'' A great deal
else was also said, including reference to "the appropriation
was applied for," "the application was made to appropriate,"
etc., etc. So much was. said that, fifteen years later, the writer
of the opinion cited the case as authority opposed to the decision
of this court in Deseret Livestock Company vs. Hoopiania,
66 Utah 25. But the facts and decision of Sowards vs.
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1'1eagher are as \Ve have given them above and as better expressed by Justice Thurman, pages 45-6 of 25 Utah.
But in any event, this case neither decides nor says anything
concerning the prerequisites to the approval of an application.
It is, however, a case in which an application was nrejected by
the state engineer on the sole groundn that it was rr in conflict
U'ith prior applications.,')
Counsel follows immediately with this: ((The State Engineer should examine the application to ascertain the declared
intent, and if there is reasonable probability to believe that a
right must be perfected, the State Engineer has been told by
this Court that he should approve the application.''
Where and when has this Court told the State Engineer
that or anything like that? It is an almos.t necessary inference
that Counsel asserts it to have been in Sowards vs. Meagher
on January 22, 1910. The fault with the statement is that it
omits all context-((reasonably probability'' in view of what?
From what counsel says, one might judge that the matter is to
be determined from an examination of the application.
Yates vs. Newton, 59 Utah 105
The waters of Pole Canyon, including certain tributary
springs had been appropriated long prior to the application
before the court, but ((It appears that the gorge or ravine leading from this canyon is gravelly and that after June 15th, or
thereabouts, the waters which run from the springs are not sufficient in volume to reach the mouth of the canyon, but sink into
the sand and disappear. It evidently was the intention of the
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fession, that possibly by the expenditure of money and the
gathering together of the waters of this canyon they could be
prevented from sinking or disappearing into the ground and
thereby be put in a beneficial use both in irrigation and in the
production of power. It is quite evident that it was not the
intention of the engineer to in any way disturb the rights of
respondents to the use of the waters as they have been used
for many years. If such were the intent, it was clearly beyond
his power or authority to grant such right."
In relation to the duty of the State Engineer, the Court
said, ((It is only in the event that the engineer finds unappropriated water that applicants inay obtain rights to the use of
water in this state.'' But here, as the court found, there was
unappropriated water. It was that which sank into the sand
and disappeared ((after June 15th, or thereabouts." The court
was of opinion, based on the record, that effort to save it t<must
ultimately prove a failure," but there was no occasion to prevent the attempt. The case was remanded with direction to
the District Court to retain jurisdiction to make such order as
might be necessary if it appeared that the effort to save the
lost water did interfere with the rights of the prior appropriator.
This last was proper under the facts, but we think it would have
been still more appropriate to have limited the approval to the
non-irrigation season.
We cannot agree with the Court's theory of the facts, for
it seems clear that the sands and gravels into which the spring
waters disappeared were not lost, but went to fill the underground reservoir contributory to the prior appropriator's stream,
and that if withdrawn they would necessarily have to be made
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up next season. \X'e should have concluded, therefore, that the
nlosf' \Vaters had been appropriated. One might as well apply
for the right to use \Vaters which might be ttsaved" by driving a
tunnel into the canyon \valls of Big Cottonwood and of saving
from loss that which is stored there but which does not reach
points of diversion during late summer and all winte~ months.
Ho\vever, as the facts were made to appear, the decision is the
same in principle as that of Little Cottonwood Water Company
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah, where the unappropriated water was that
lost in carriage through an open ditch.
The case is cited (page 6) to this: t]n Yates vs. Newton . . . the Court said that no order of the State Engineer
can disturb vested rights in water." The Court did say that,
but, though the Engineer cannot disturb the rights, the frequent
necessity of saying so evinces clearly enough that he can and
often does ((disturb" their owners. That fact and the fact that
rights may be interfered with and affected is one of the several
reasons for the provisions of Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100 of
the code.
Robinson vs. Schoenfeld, 62 Utah 233
Plaintiff, who had made no application to the State Engineer since 1903, and who had made no appropriation before
that date, brought an action to prevent interference with their
using springs by a person who had made applications, then in
good standing, for the right to use their waters. It was held
that ttthe fact that defendant had filed his applications, and
that those filings were in good standing could be offered in
evidence in defense against the claim for an jn junction against
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defendant to restrain him from in any way interfering with the
waters of the springs."
The Court said (( * * * the filing of an application in the
State Engineer's office" does not ((in and of itself amount to
an appropriation of water. It at most gives to the applicant a
right to complete the appropriations."
This case is cited (page 7) to the following: ((The Utah
court has, time and again, said that an application to appropriate is not a completed appropriation." Robinson vs.
Schoenfeld doesn't decide that, true as it is; but one might
answer: who ever thought that an application to appropriate
is a completed appropriation? The statute expressly states,
however, that when approved it confers the right to complete
an appropriation. An application to appropriate is not a completed appropriation and neither is a Certificate of Appropriation, nor is a ((Decreed Right."· All, however, within varying
limits, give or attest the right to appropriate.
This is something to which we shall return when we discuss the invalidity of Respondents' contention that the existence
of rights of the United States and Provo River Water Users
Association, being founded on approved applications, which
when exercised exhaust the proposed source, are not inconsistent
with there still being ccunappropriated" in that source, because
((an application to appropriate is not a completed appropriation." It's a queer state of mind, indeed, that will permit the
use of inexact and careless expressions as the basis of a conelusion meticulously pedantic, ·as well as one opposite to the
physical facts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

Deseret Livestock Company vs. Hoopiania, 66 Utah 25
The facts and decision of the court as to the procedtire
necessary to the acquisition of a water right sufficiently appear
from the following from the opinion of Chief Justice Gidion:
''\Ve are of the opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature
of Utah, by the act of 1903, intended to limit the method of
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public waters of
the state to the method or means prescribed in that act. The
rights attempted to be acquired by respondent Hoopiania by
actually diverting the water and applying the same to a beneficial use must therefore be held to be subject to the right of
appellant who will acquire the first right by completing its
appropriation initiated by its application filed in the state engineer's office on April 25, 1918." The court held the statute
to mean just what it said.
This case is cited to the effect that ((an application to appropriate is not an appropriation," etc., followed by this:
rryhe1'efore, so long as there are only applications on a stream,
all of the waters thereof are unappropriated and new applications ought not to be rejected. It is not anticipated that this
principle of law will be seriously controverted." It won't be,
or at least it won't be ((seriously," for it can't well be seriously
considered.
To say that ((an application to appropriate is not an appropriation" is to state a fact of the same quality as to state that
"an application for employment is not an employment," which
is fairly obvious. An approved application is not an appropriation either, but approval confers the right to appropriate, and
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must be founded on a finding that there "is unappropriated
water in the proposed source" and that ((the proposed use \vill
not impair existing rights." Nothing in that sentence is the
result of any reasoning process; the first part is axiomatic and
the last two parts are statements of the statute - Chapter 3,
Title 100. Now the Attorney General follows that ''an application to appropriate is not an appropriation" with "There
is no appropriation of water until a Certificate of Appropriation
issues" and then goes on with the "therefore} so long as there
are only applications on a stream all of the waters thereof are
unappropriated and new applications ought not to be rejected."
What is the use of saying that "there is no appropriation of
water until a Certificate of Appropriation issues" when every
one knows that approval of an application authorizes an appropriation, and that no Certificate will issue until an appropriation
has been made and proved as required by Section 16 ? What
is meant, we suppose or, as we are impelled to believe, what
Respondent ought to have meant is something as easily said;
that, as between an applicant and the State of Utah, approval
by it of an application confers the right to appropriate, but it
confers no right which may not be terminated by failure to do
within time what has been authorized.
Falkenberg vs. Neff, 72 Utah 258
Action for damages for wrongful destruction of a dam
and diverting works.
Both Appellants and Respondents had uuncompleted applications for appropriations for irrigation purposes of definite
quantities of water therein pending before the State Engineer."
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Appellants' \Yas prior tn time. Both had been approved.
nNeither . . . had been perfected." Respondents ((constructed
a diverting dam across the creek to a point above the Appellants·
proposed point of diversion and thereafter diverted a quantity
of '''ater from the stream through a flume, and were using it
to aid in the construction of a ditch.'' Appellants destroyed
the dam. At the time they had ttconstructed no diverting works
in the stream, and had no ability to make, and had made no
diversion or use of any of the water flowing therein.''
Appellants sought to justify their action on the ground
that their approved application for 30 cubic feet· per second of
water, being prior to that of respondents, entitled them to the
uninterrupted flow at that rate to their proposed point of diversion, even though they had no present use for it.
The lower court charged the jury that if they nfound that
Respondents' dam and diversion of the water in no way lessened
the supply of the water which Appellants could and would then
use, Appellants had no right to interfere with or remove the
Respondents' dam."
Held that the charge was unobjectionable.
This case is cited Page 8-9 of the Attorney General's reply.
·'There is another factor which indicates that the waters in
question are unappropriated. The Supreme Court said in Falkenberg vs. Neff . . . that where the plain_tiff and defendant
both held approved applications and the defendant's was prior
in time, the defendant had no right to complain of the diversion
of water by the plaintiff if the defendant was not then in a
position to use it. That at such times as an appropriator is not
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using the water . . . it is subject to appropriation and use by
others." This is amplified on the same pages, and that following, where it is said, "whether or not the Provo River Water
Users Association can later reassert the right to capture this
water is foreign to this law suit."
Now we ask, with all respect possible under the circumstances, how can Falkenberg vs. Neff and that comment be
th<;>ught to be applicable here? It all appears under the heading:
"Waters Running to Waste are Unappropriated Waters." No
one, so far as we know, questions it. Suppose that in Falkenberg vs. Neff the Appellants' dam and diverting works had
been completed and their irrigation project was in operation,
and that then Respondents had constructed a tight dam above,
with such effect that the 30 second feet to which Appellants
were entitled wouldn't reach their dam.· If those had been the
facts, and the court had still decided against Appellants, the
case could have been properly cited here. And suppose in such
case that Respon~ents had sought to justify their withholding
above on the ground that the waters appeared to be going to
waste . . . ((they were just running down stream." Surely they
were running down stream; were running and, except for their
diversion above, would have run into Appellants' reservoir.
It would be idle, and worse, in such case, to talk of waters
running to waste; and so is it here. The Deer Creek Division
of the Provo River Project cannot be likened to the irrigation
project of Appellants in Falkenberg vs. Neff. The United
States, under its Weber River applications, has long since
appropriated water from that river and has transported it to
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the Provo, has stored it in the Deer Creek Reservoir, has distributed it on lands under the project and, unless interfered
'vith by diversions inconsistent, it will recapture and restore
and reuse it again. All this was established by Respondent Jones
in response to his successful effort to show that Lehi Irrigation
Company had no right to the use of the waters sought to be
appropriated by him. No question is made of this; but it is said
to be all irrelevant and immaterial; that the rights of Provo
RiYer Water Users Association are ((entirely foreign to this
la\\. suit."
"Foreign to this law suit" because (pages 9-10) ((This
case \vas presented to the State Engineer as a private dispute
between an irrigation company and a landowner on whose
lands waters arise by seepage. Each claimed a superior right
to use the water. At the time of dispute the waters were
running to waste. The State Engineer, by approving the
application, simply intended to settle the imn1ediate dispute
between those two users and to recognize in Jones a superior
right of use because he had filed on it, and Lehi Irrigation
Company had not. The approval order was expressly made
(subject to prior rights.' Certainly, under the cases cited next
above, there was a sufficient showing to justify the approval
of the application."
((The cases cited above" are Falkenberg vs. Neff and
Adams vs. Portage Irrigation Reservoir & Power Company
95 Utah 1. Mention of the latter (except as limited on
rehearing) is something we regard as approaching the indelicate. It is cited (Cto the same effect" as Falkenberg vs. Neff.
It isn't at all, as anyone who can read it through ought to
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perceive with less than "half an eye." But the Attorney General
seems to like it, especially the l(air and the winds and the
sunshine'' part which he appropriat~s to his own use on
page 13.
Returning to the paragraph of quotation next but one
above. If that and the many other expressions of identical
effect from both Respondents are accurate as to \vhat the
State Engineer actually did, and it is what he ought to have
done--then we are as wrong as can be, and our labor in this
matter is all for nothing, because, in that event, it has been
occasioned by a complete misapprehension of the duties of
the State Engineer as fixed by the legislature and the decisions
of this court. But if we are not mistaken-if the obligation of
the Engineer is as we have defined at pages 9-10 & 16-17 above,
and as this court has defined it in Eardley vs. Terry, then
we urge that this case be remanded regardless of the
rzghts of the Provo River Water Users Association-that is
to say, without consideration of them or their legal effect.
We urge this, in that event, because the trial court did precisely as Respondents say the State Engineer did and ought
to have done. (See Finding of Fact No. 7). And what is
that! It is the regard and consideration of the case entirely
as a private dispute with no consideration or regard whatever
of the statute. What each-the trial court and the Engineer
-((intended to settle" and so all that either did settle was
((the immediate dispute between those two users and to
recognize in Jones a superior right of use because he had filed
on it, and Lehi Irrigation Company had not,'' as though the
case had been that presented by Robinson vs. Schoenfeld.
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As Counsel for Provo River Water Users Association,
and as Amicus Curire also, \ve feel that the case should be
remanded with direction to reject the Jones application, but,
as Amicus Curire alone, we suggest that it be remanded in
any event, so that, at least, there shall be some approach to
compliance with the real essense of the law. As it is, all
that was done or attempted to be done is what is reflected in
Finding No. 7 .
.. The waters thus and here involved have ar1sen during
approximately the last three years, and the appropriation and
use of these will not diminish plaintiff's supply of water under
its appropriations, and will not impair any existing rights of

plaintiff.-·-·
((That's all there is; there isn't any more."
Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah
243.

Kimball made application for right to appropriate 10
cubic feet of water per second, proposed to be saved by delivering through a pipe line water diverted from the creek and
delivered to places of use by means of an open ditch from
which the amount of the proposed savings was lost by
evaporation and seepage.
The court held the savings to be subject to appropriation, and
hence that it had not been shown that there was no unappropriated water in the proposed source. It held also that practical
difficulf'res1n the way of effecting the proposed savings had
nothing to do with the propriety of granting an application
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for right to appropriate it. ''The inquiry on this branch of
the case ends when, from the facts found, it cannot be said
that there is no unappropriated water in the proposed source."
That is what this case decides. Chief Justice Cherry said
that the application ought to be approved, anyway, because
of the existence of some flood waters. But they were not the
subject of Kimball's application.
This case is cited by the Attorney General (pages 5, 6
and 7) to the effect that ccthe State Engineer has no judicial
power, and he must not attempt to decide judicial questions
or determine vested rights except in a very general way" and
"It is only where there is no probability that the application
might be perfected that the State Engineer should deny the
application," and, ''The Utah Court has, time and again, said
that an application to appropriate is not a completed appropriation."
We have no fault to find with any of this except ((It is
only where there is no probability that the application might
be perfected that the State Engineer should deny the application." We suppose this was intended to read, "It is only
when there is no probability that the appropriation might be
perfected" etc. But even so, it is an inaccurate statement.
This court may have said something like that. In fact,
unappropriated water having been found, this court in Yates
vs. Newton held that the application ought not to be rejected
even though it appeared that the effort ((must prove a failure."
There also, what was involved was a "Savings Filing." It
is only in relation to such a situation that the language objected
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to is relevant without addition. It cannot be properly applied
in the first instance to the situation presented by Section 8,
Chapter 3, Title 100, where the Engineer is authorized to
approve only HIF":
1) There is unappropriated water in
the proposed source; (2) The proposed use \vill not impair
existing rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of
the water.''
tt (

As to the other language quoted and said to have been
the .. holding" of the court in Little Cottonwood Water
Company vs. Kimball; the fault found is not necessarily that
it was unnecessary to the decision, if it was, but that it is
taken out of a context with which it may have been in accord
and is used as the basis of faulty reasoning. The Engineer
has no judicial powers; therefore he has no powers. ((An
application is not an appropriation. It is but a preliminary
notice of intention. There is no appropriation of vvater until
a Certificate of Appropriation issues. Therefore, so long
as there are only applications on a stream, all the waters thereof
are unappropriated, and therefore, new applications ought
not to be rejected."
One should not expect to find decisions on this, for it is
something which cannot be ((seriously" considered. It was
implicit, however, in the decision of Sowards vs. ·Meagher,
where one application was ((rejected by the State Engineer
on the sole ground" that it was (tin conflict with prior applications." It was also implicit in the decision in Tanner vs.
Bacon, State Engineer. In both cases the interference and consequent rejection of the interfering application was with an
application under which the authorized appropriation had
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not yet been made. Here the waters in question have been
found to be the result of appropriations already made of
waters from the Weber River, impounded in and used from
the Deer Creek Reservoir by means of the Provo Reservoir
Canal enlargement. Will anyone contend that those waters
have not been appropriated?
This court ((knows,'' or if it doesn't, it cannot but realize
that it must be, that holders of approved applications often
appropriate and use U'ater continuously, often for years, before
a Certificate of Appropriation issues. It's common practice.
It is true under the Provo River Project, and it is and has been
true as to literally thousands of other appropriators in similar
situation.
The briefs of Respondents, and especially the Reply brief
of the Attorney General, have been largely composed by a
stringing together of isolated sentences or unauthorized versions of sentences from the opinions of this court and ·by
adding to them conclusions which do not logically follow.
It is possibly impolitic to say it, but we cannot help being
reminded of what Mr. Justice Thurman said and did in
Stookey vs. Green, 53 Utah 311. ((We appreciate the importance of every decision of this court relating to the
subject of irrigation and water rights, especially when we
realize that even fugitive suggestions outside the issues of
the case, as well as expressions applicable to the facts, may
be erroneously referred to and relied on in subsequent cases."
This, after reviewing and stating the effect of half a dozen
or so former Utah water cases, and strongly intimating that if
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certain facts not before the
\vould be so and so. The
Green, \vhich really decides
perhaps, as any water case,
thing.

court were before it, its decision
result has been that Stookey vs.
nothing, has been cited as often,
and as authority for almost any-

Clark vs. North Cottonwood Irrigation & Water Co.
79 Utah 425.
This is another ((the court said" case. It is otherwise of
no possible relevancy here. ((The court said that it is quite
generally held that one may not acquire a perfected right to
have seepage water kept up, but when seepage water finds its
way back to the natural stream from which it originally came,
such water may be appropriated again. All the parties to
this litigation, the court said, proceeded well they rp.ight upon
the theory that the seepage water in controversy was subject
to appropriation."
Neither of the subjects of the court's statement were in
issue, but the court did say something like that, but not quite
that. It said ((permanent" right, not ((perfected" right. If
we were not in agreement with what the court said, we might
cite what the court said in Stookey vs. Green in regard to
Garns vs. Rollins 41 Utah · 260 and Roberts vs. Gribble 43
Utah 511. ((The principle underlying these cases seems to
be that waste and seepage waters from artificial irrigation
constitute an artificial, rather than natural, source of supply,
and therefore are not subject to appropriation." But we don't
cite them to that point because we think they decide no more
than that the appropriator of seepage from irrigation above
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cannot require its continuance.
Again we might well distinguish, for here there is no
"seepage \vater" that C(fi.nds its way. back to the natural strearn
jro1n which it originally came." The seepage water in question
here was appropriated and brought from a foreign water shed
for the benefit of a great reclamation project to which it is
essential. .There is thus presented a state of facts very different
from that in Respondent's ((the court said." More appropriate
we suggest is what the Supreme court of the United States and
the Federal. Court said and decided in Ide vs. United States,
263 U. S. 497, and in United States vs. Haga, 276 Fed. 41:
I(In point of law the general principle upon which
the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy;
one "\\rho by the expenditure of money and labor diverts
appropriable water fron1 a stream, and thus makes it
available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its exclusive control so lortg as he is able to willing to apply
it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is
commonly known as wastage fron1 surface run-off and
deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical
irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and
natural justice strongly support such a rule. Nor is
it essential to his control that the appropriator maintain
continuous actual possession of such water. So long
as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to
use, he may assert his rights. It is not necessary that
he confine it upon his own land or convey it in an
artificial conduit. It is requisite, of course, that he
be able to identify it; but, subject to that limitation,
he may conduct it through natural channels and may
even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with
other waters. In short', the rights of an appropriator
in these respects are not affected by the fact that the
water has once been used."
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We might go even further and cite Clark vs. North
Cottonwood Irrigation & Water Company ourselves, claiming
that the following indicates (as it well may) that ~ven seepag~
\Vater finding Hits way back to the natural stream from which
it originally came" may not be appropriated unless it be sho\vn
that the original appropriator has abandoned. We quote
from page 437 of 79 Utah:
··There is no pleading, finding, or proof that defendant
abandoned its claim to the right _to use the water (seepage
and return flow, it was) which finds its way into North
Cottonwood Creek ... "
.. What we do decide is that the evidence in this case fails
to show that defendant has lost its right to regulate, control,
and distribute to its stockholders the water which finds its
way into the North Cottonwood Creek above the old intake
of the Richards-Spackman-Van Fleet ditch."
Tanner vs. Humphries, State Engineer, 87 Utah 164.
This case has to do with the duty of the State Engineer
and, on appeal from his decision, that if the trial court, on application for change of place of diversion. So far as at all helpful
here, the court held that n. • • the burden rests upon plaintiff
(the applicant) to establish the necessary facts to make out a
Prima Facie case" and that on motion for nonsuit (<testimony to
the effect that the diversion would not affect the character of the
water in the flume a~d that it would not impair any rights of
the Power Company was sufficient ... ''
This case is not cited by Respondents. We are in perfect
accord with what the court said as necessarily following from
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arid incident to the decision as quoted, that C(lt would be impracticable to require the plaintiff (applicant) to ferret out
all the ways in which the others might perchance be injured
and offer proof in negation thereof as a part of its affirmative
case." In the case of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones,
however, the applicant's negation of injury to one water user
affirmed it as to another. In no case we have seen has there
been a similar state of facts.

Eardley vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367.
Application was made to appropriate ''Y2 cubic foot per
second of the alleged unappropriated waters of a creek . . ."
The water sought to be appropriated was that saved from loss
by trenching a wash. The trenching had been accomplished
before the filing of the application, and the only testimony
offered was that ((the natural flow of the stream was increased
1;2 second foot'' and therefore that there was unappropriated
water in the proposed source.
It was "apparent from the pleadings, the evidence and
the decree entered by the trial court that the proceedings
before the court were considered as involving the litigation
of the respective rights of the parties to tbe water of Beaver
Datn wash and a final determination of such rights and their
nature and extent. The Respondent was not only granted a
reinstatement of his application to appropriate water and the
right to continue thereunder by the decree, but he was likewise given a present grant of all the water developed as
conserved by him."
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For this reason it was necessary to remand the case for
correction of the decree as to the present grant, to state \vhy,
and thus to define the duties of the State Engineer and, on
appeal from him, the nature and scope of those of the trial
court.
Hit should be remembered that the proceeding 1n the
district court \Yas by way of appeal from the decision of the
state engineer rejecting respondent's application to appropriate water. Under the statute, section 100-3-8, R. S. Utah
1933, when an application is filed the state engineer is required
to determine whether there this unappropriated water in the
proposed source of supply and whether the water sought to
be appropriated can be put to a benefical use and can be
diverted from the source of supply without doing· material
injury to the prior rights of others. While the statute, R. S.
1933, 100-3-7, also provides for the filing of protests to any
application to appropriate water, this does not enlarge the
scope of the proceedings before the state engineer beyond
the determination of the question above stated. The state
engineer is required to determine whether the application
should be rejected or approved by a consideration of the elements above stated. He does not, and has no authority in
such p~oceeding to, fix and determine the rights of the parties
to the proceeding. He simply determines whether there is
unappropriated water which can be beneficially used without
injury to or conflict with prior rights. If the application is
approved, the applicant must thereafter construct his works,
make beneficial use, and, by actual use of the water, fix the
nature and limits of the rights which can be claimed and.
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granted under the application. The approval or rejection
of the application is simply a preliminary matter and is not
intended to, and does not, fix the rights of the parties before
the state engineer in such proceeding. When an appeal is
taken from the decision of the state engineer· in such a case,
the trial court is required to determine the same questions de
novo. It determines whether the application should be approved or rejected and does not fix the rights of the parties
beyond the determination of that matter. The issues remain
the same upon an appeal to this court. All that the district
court or this court, on appeal from the district court, is called
upon to do is to determine whether the application should be
rejected or approved. If it appears that there is unappropriated
water which the applicant seeks to appropriate and which he
can beneficially use without injury to or conflict with the prior
rights of others, then the application should be approved
by the court; otherwise, it should be rejected. If the application is approved, then the applicant must proceed to perfect
his appropriation as provided by law and make proof thereof
under Section 100-3-16 R. S. 1933. Until it is so perfected,
he cannot be decreed or given present rights as under a completed appropriation. It may be that, although the application
is approved,· the applicant may not be able to perfect his
appropriation.''
tcit seems clear to us that the Legislature intended that
when the application is filed, the state engineer is called upon
to determine preliminary whether there is probable cause to
believe that an application can be perfected, having due
regard to whether the1"e is unappropriated wate,- available
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for appropriation, u'hether it can be put to a beneficial use,
"nd u'hethe-r it can be direrted and so used without injuring
or conflicting U'ith the prior rights of others. If he determines
there is such probability, the application is approved and the
applicant then proceeds to detnonstrate by an, actual use of
the rights sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such
rights."

"The District Court should simply determine whether
the application was rightly rejected. In determining that
question, the court stands in th·e same position as the state
engineer did. It must determine from the evidence whether
there is probable cause to be~ieve that there is unappropriated
water available or water which can be made available for use;
that the applicant can beneficially use such unappropriated
water; and that such water can be diverted from the source
of supply and used without injury to or conflict with prior
rights."
This case is cited by Respondent Jones and by the Attorney
General on at least four separate occasions~
First to this: (original Respondents, page 5) ((The courts
below and here can. only determine whether the State
Engineer rightly approved the application, as against the protest of an Appellant, and will sustain him where he does not
act 'arbitrarily or capriciously.' " To this also cited Tanner
vs. Bacon, 103 Utah 494. Neither of these cases gives countenance to what is thus claimed for them; nor does any other
Utah case. The trial in the District Court is de novo. The
statute directs that it shall be and Eardly vs. Terry says that
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it must be. ((It is the duty of the court to try the case de novo."
There is no question of sustaining the Engineer. The ((arbitrarily or capriciously'' used by counsel is picked out of this,
from Tanner vs. Bacon, ((This decision (of the District Court)
not being arbitrary or capricious but based upon experience,
and well recognized principles must be sustained."
Next (Reply of Attorney General, page 5) (( . . . the
issues are limited to those which confronted the State Engineer
in the approval or rejection of an application."

If by this is

meant that rejection or approval of this application is before
the Engineer and, on appeal, before the District Court, it is
correct, Eardley vs. Terry says so.

But if what is meant is

that if the Engineer did not notice or give regard to all the
facts, the court may not, it is quite obviously wrong.
Again (page 6) (( ... In Eardley vs. Terry the court said
no final rights are acquired until proof of appropriation."
Well, what of it?
It may be that Eardley vs. Terry is cited elsewhere, but
there is no use in pursuing further the claims made for it.
They are all directed toward one single purpose-to persuade

this court not to decide this case, because, after all, as we
paraphrase, ((approval of an application is of no consequence;
neither the State Engineer nor the trial court have the power
to decide anything; and an application is not an appropriation.
There is no necessity to decide anything here, because everything can be decided elsewhere."
But why Eardley vs. Terry has been cited to any purpose
of Respondents is something we are unable to understand, for
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this is a case in which the court has defined the duties of the
State Engineer and the trial court to be precisely those \ve
have consistently and persistently attributed to him. We are
inclined to repeat here what we have already quoted fron1
the opinion, but, looking over what has already been given,
\ve see that it is clearly sufficient. Nevertheless, there are
certain expressions so definitely and decisively in accord with
our own ideas t4at we give them again. (Last paragraph,
page 373
the State Engineer is required to detet·mine ..
." etc. (Top of page 374) rryhe State Engineer is 1·equired
to determine ... " etc. (Middle of page 274) (( ... the trial
court is required to determine the same questions de novo/}
(page 377) rrlt must determine .. .n That, we suggest, settles
that; and so far as anything can be, Eardley vs. Terry also settles
what is to be determined. The court is explicit, and so is the
statute. That the determination may be upset in another
and independent proceeding has nothing, and of course -it has
nothing, whatever to do with the matter. rry he State Engineer
is required to determine.''
<t

•••

Rocky Ford Irrigation Company vs. Kents Lake, etc. Company, 104 Utah 202
((In a trial de novo in the district court, the court found
on the conflicting evidence that there was unappropriated
water during certain high water seasons, and that the applicant
could put the water to a beneficial use. Therefore, unless it
appears that the approval of the application will injure the
vested rights of prior appropriators, the application to appropriate should be approved. See 100-3-8, Utah Code
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Annotated 1943; Little Cottonwood Water
Kimball.''

Company vs.

The applicant's proposed storage reservoir was upstream
from the place of diversion of one proh~sant and from a power
plant, but (( ... we should not deny this application merely
because it puts Kents Lake in a position, as the upstream
junior appropriator} where it might, when sufficient water
was not available for all concerned, interfere with the plaintiff's
rights." Clearly not, it seems to us; that is a common situation.
To hold otherwise would prohibit a large part of the water
uses of the state.
This case is cited as follows: ((It is only where there i~
no probability that the application might be perfected that the
State Engineer should deny the application. Such was the
holding of the court in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. vs. Kents
Lake Res. Co."
We seem to remember that this was noticed some place
above. Certainly that was not the ((holding of the court" in
that case, and anyone who can read ought to be aware of it.
Neither is it the ((holding" of any other case that has come
before the Supreme Court of Utah. The trouble with the last
quoted statement is the same as with so very many others in
Respondent's original and Reply briefs. What is said is
obviously n·ot ((the holding" of the Court in any case; but we
read and re-read case after case to see if there was some (tfugitove expression" identical or similar or of the same meaning.
The Court may have said it in some case .in relation to something else; for example, it may have spoken of the probability
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of an applicant's being able to do the things necessary to perfect
the appropriation which approval authorizes him to commence.
Then we think of Eardley vs. Terry which is certainly perfectly
clear as to the prerequisites of approval, and we seem to recall
use of the word ((probability" in it; so we read that for the- Nth
time and find it, but there we find it as part of a sentence in
which there are some sixty words of context not given by
counsel.
We are moved to waste that much space and time, as well
as money, because we have, at last, come to the end of the
Attorney General's brief-just before his ((Summary", where
he says, ((This court has always told the State Engineer that
the mere fact that a man is given a ((fighting" right high on
a stream is no justification for refusing his application. See
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. vs. Kents Lake, supra." Well, what of it?
Naturally, the mere fact that an applicant is upstream is no
ground for ttrefusing his application." But where has there
been any mention of a ((fighting" right?
Now we come to the Attorney General's ((Summary," upon
which we shall comment sentence by sentence with our comments in italics.
((The Supreme Court has told the State Engineer that he
has no judicial powers; that he must not, in ruling on an
application, attempt to adjudicate or determine vested rights."
True he has no judicial powers, but rr • •• the State Engineer
is required to determine whether there is unappropriated
water in the proposed source of supply and whether the water
sought to be appropriated can be put to a beneficial use and
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can be diveretd from the sourc~ of supply without doing injury
to the prior rights of others." Eardley vs. Terry 94 Utah 367
at 373.

rrw hen

an appeal is taken from the decision of the State
Engineer in such a case, the trial court is required to determine
the source questions de novo. It determines whether the
application should be approved or rejected and does not fix
the rights of the parties beyond the determination of that
matter. The issues remain the same upon an appeal to this
court. All that the district court or this court, an appeal from
the district court, is called upon to do is to determine whether
the application should be rejected or approved. If it appears
that the1'e is unappropriated water which the applicant seeks
to appropriate and which he can beneficially use without injury
to or conflict with the prior rights of others, then the application should be approved by the Court; otherwise it should
be rejected.n Eardly vs. Terry, 94 Utah 367 at 374.
nOn the question of vested rights the State Engineer is
to make only a very general inquiry.''

''The State Engineer is required to detertnine."
((If, after such an inquiry, he has any reasonable basis
for believing that a right might be perfected, he is to resolve
such doubts in favor of approval."

"All right, if ''he has any reasonable basis," but there is
none in this case where the amount in question is only a small
part of the total. There are no doubts to be resolved. There
is no "probability" or possibility of any left over. And the1'e
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is no probability that the P-ro,vo River Water Users Association
u'ill abandon its rights. They a1·e being exercised at this
moment. They have been continuously exe,rcised for approximately the last three years. Finding of Fact No. 7.

((The Supreme Court has also said that an application
to appropriate water is not an appropriation and that waters
covered only by application are still not appropriated.''
Certainly an application is not an appropriation, and
certainly the Supreme Court has said so. Certainly, however,
appt·oval of an application authorizes the making of an
app,.opriation. (If an application is approved, rrthe applicant
then proceeds to demonstrate by an actual use of the rights
sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such rights.n Earley
vs. Terry 94 Utah 367 at 376. Section 8 Ch 3 Title 100 Utah
Code Annotated 1943.) Equally certain it is that the Supreme
Cout't has NOT said rrthat waters covered only by an application are still not appropriated." To say that an application
is not an appropriation or that approval of an application
confers no rrfinal right~ or that the facts or conclusions upon
which approval is based may be questioned in another proceeding, are all sayings of very different character from that
attributed to the court by counsel. To say rr that waters covered
only by an application are still not appropriated" is to say
something that everyone knows is not true. For illustration
we need to go no farther afield than the facts of this case.
During the yea1~s 1944, 1945, 1946, and 1947, the Provo River
Water Users Association, acting under the authority of the
approved Weber River applications of the United States,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56

diverted flood waters of the Weber River into the WeberProvo Division canal which is a part of the completed works
of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River Project. Those
flood waters were transported through a nine mile canal
to the Provo River and by means of it into the Deer Creek
Reservoir. From there theY. were turned into the Provo Reservoir Canal and were utilized to produce crops on some 40,000
acres of land.
All of those waters-several hundred thousand acre feet
-are rrwaters covered only by an application/' NOT APPROPRIATED!!!
But counsel may mean (distinguished fronz what he said)
that the flood waters so appropriated were not appropriated
UNTIL taken into the canal, etc. But the United States had
the right to divert them. It has exercised its right for four
successive years-ever since its diverting works and storage
reservoir have been completed. It has expended upwards of
twenty million dollars with no other purpose. One might add
that, in the sense of what tve are supposing counsel to have
1neant, no waters, whether covered by Certificate, Decree, Approved Application or General AdjudicationJ are actually APPROPRIATED until diverted.
To say that the Supre1ne Court has said what is attributed
to it is, to say the least, uncomplementary. To use the ridiculous
statement as the basis for an argument that in spite of the
facts stated above there is still unappropriated water in the
pro posed source, if rr covered only by applications" ts something beyond our liberty to characterize.
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((The court has also said that waters running to waste
are for the time being public waters open to appropriation,
and that waters which have escaped from the control of the
original appropriator and returned to the natural source of
supply again become public waters.',
It might just as well be said that waters diverted from
the Weber River into the Provo u'ere running to waste while
on their way to Deer Creek Reservoir, or that all the watet·
in the Provo on its way to Utah Lake is rrrunning to waste."
Furthermore, these are NOT waters which have returned or
ever will return to nthe natural source of supply." THEY ARE
WATERS BROUGHT FROM A FOREIGN WATERSHED
AND IMPOUNDED IN A STORAGE RESERVOIR. IT
MAY WELL BE SAID THAT THEY ARE CREATED
WATERS WHICH, UNLESS SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN
ABANDONED, BELONG TO THE . CREATOR.

"All three of the above are present in the instant case
and combined they certainly suggest a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not all of the waters are appropriated. Therefore, the application should have been approved."
What do the rrthree above" amount to, alone or conzbined!
Three times zero is zero.

UThe other issues as to ownership raised by the Amicus
Curire simply ask this court to do what it has already told the
State Engineer he must not do, to-wit: make an adjudication
of vested rights."
No such thing is asked. All that is asked is that there be
done in this case what the statute and the decisions ·of this
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court (everyone of them) direct shall be· done." The State
Engineer is required to determine.n The District Court rrmust
determine from the evidence whether there is probable cause
to believe that there is unappropriated water which can be
made available for use; that the applicant can beneficially use
such appropriated water; and that such water can be diverted
from the source of supply and used without injurY, to. or conflict with prior rights/' Eardley vs. Terry.
There is something interesting, something curzous and
astonishing, in this last sentence of Counsel's rrsummary/'
elaborated elsewhere in the three briefs of Respondents.
It has apparently never occurred to apply the rrstate Engineer has no judicial powers" to the ordinary case. It seems
not to have occurred to either counsel that the inevitable result
of their reasoning is that neither the State Engineer or the
District Court can !/..either approve or disapprove an application for right to appropriate. They can;t approve, for that
necessarily involves a determination that all of the waters
of the proposed source have not been appropriated and that
there are no conflicting rights. They can't disapprove, for
that involves a determination that there is no unappropriated
water in the proposed source and that there are other rights
U'hich exhaust it.
· It would never occur to either respondent to argue that
the State Engineer could not approve the Jones applications
because that result necessarily involved a determination that
the waters ·in question were not within the rights of Lehi Irrigation Company. Neither would it occur to eithe1~ to argue
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that the case would have to be reversed if the District Court
had rejected the Jones applications because it had determined
that the waters in question u·ere and always had been contributory to Dry Ct·eek and that Lehi Irrigation Company had
(no matter how) long since acquired the right to use them!
Curiously and astonishingly} however, the rights of the
United States and the Provo River Water Users Association
may not be rrdetermined" because rrthis Court ... has already
told the State Engineer he must not ... make an adjudication
of vested rights~
We have very carefully examined all of the decisions
and all of the expressions of this court direct!y or indirect! y
relating to the matter before it here, with the result that we
have no doubt of the source of Respondent's confusion. THE
CASE IS UNIQUE. No new or unusual principles of law
are involved; it is the tacts that are peculiar. In almost every
other case of its kind that has been brought to this court the
rights of the actually contending parties have either been, or
they have seemed to be, or it has not appeared that they were
not, the only rights relevant to the issue. Sowards and Meagher,
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company and Telluride Power Comjany and Kents Lake Irrigation Company, Eardley and the
Terrys, etc., etc., so that in some instances the matter has been
spoken of and treated as though it has been a ((private dispute";
and so in practical effect it has been. But in no case has this
court failed to enunciate the principles involved in any substance or effect differently than in Eardley vs. Terry.
Never before, so far as we have been able to discover,
has any of the actually contending parties brought before the
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court rights and interests of a person or persons not contending.
But that was done here; and, in response to direction of the
statute, and in response to the uniform pronouncements of
this court, they must be considered.
It may be recalled that some place above we have used
the word ((unworthy" in reference to the ((third party" argument. What we had in mind is the fact that everyone knows,
and especially everyone associated with the State Engineer
knows, that not only is the State Engineer required by law to
"determine" rights and interests of persons not before himprotest or no protest-but also that it has been the uniform
practice of the present State Engineer and of every one of his
predecessors to do so.
We do not suggest that the ((determination" required
to be made by the State Engineer or, an appeal from his
decision, by the trial court, calls for .anything in practical
effect in the nature of the general adjudication suit, or that
an applicant is bound at peril to approval to ((ferret out" all
possibilities of conflict. What we do suggest, and urge as
perfectly clear and obvious, is that the Engineer is bound to
notice the records of his own office, and that, while neither
he nor the District Court can be blamed or over-ruled for
failure to consider rights not known or brought to attention,
both are bound to consider and determine the effect of rights
that are.
But both Respondents say this court ought not to do so.
"We assert that this court should not do so." (Page 4 Reply
of Attorney General). Pages 13 and 14 are devoted to a
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relation of alleged facts as to claims made by Utah Lake Users,
and their intentions in relation to the very well known intentions of the United States. ((Those parties have argued in the
past that the Bureau of Reclamation and the Provo River Water
Users Association cannot retain title to seepage waters after
they escape into Utah Lake and they have indicated that they
will oppose any attempt to perfect such a scheme for recapturing and · reusing this water.''
That's interesting indeed, but what has it to qo with this
case? The writer has known for several years that certain
(<parties have argued in the past ... " etc.; they are the parties
who opposed approval of application 12144 passed on by this
court in Tanner vs. Bacon State Engineer, 103 Utah 494
referred to in our original brief at considerable length.
For one reason or another it is argued that, Amicus Curire
having come into this case, it must be ((by-passed." It must
not be critically examined because, as it is said, there is nothing
of any importance involved anyway. Then also it must not be
decided because many will be affected by it.
We have been under the impression that the only issue
that can be presented is whether the Respondent Jones has or
has not made a case for the approval of his applications. The
facts which determine that it ought to be rejected were brought
to attention by him. That was all right as long as their effect
was to defeat the claims personal to Lehi Irrigation Company
-was all right as to counsel for Jones and Counsel for the
State Engineer so long as the case seemed to be going by default.
In deciding the matter submitted to the State Engineer
and to the district Court, and now before this court, it was
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necessary, of course, as it is, to determine the legal effect. of
the facts. In a simple action for trespass it may be necessary
to decide as to the legal effects of long occupancy of real
property. In Falkenberg vs. Neff, an action for damages,
it was necessary to decide and the court did decide that one
party had certain rights under a pending application to appropriate, etc., so that the decision is one as to water rights as well
as to damages. In Sowards vs. Meagher in order to decide
that one application was properly approved and another
properly rejected it was necessary to decide whether waters
on and intended for use on an Indian Reservation were subject
to appropriation. It is often so, but in no case is the necessity
of deciding affected by the fact that the decision will be of
wide or of narrow significance.
This court said in Eardley vs. Terry, and we think that
under the circumstances it was necessary to say . . . ((It seems
clear to us that the Legislature intended that when the application is filed, the State Engineer is called upon to determine
preliminarily whether there is probable cause to believe that
an application can be perfected, having due regard to whether
there is unappropriated water available for appropriation,
whether it can be put to a beneficial use, and whether it can
be diverted and so used without injuring or conflicting with
the prior rights of others. If he determines there is such
probability, the application is approved and the applicant
then proceeds to demonstrate by an actual use of the rights
sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such rights."
Now it seems perfectly clear to us that the facts as to
the waters in the proposed source are such that so far from
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it being probable that ((the application can be perfected,, it
is highly improbable, almost certain, that it cannot be. That
approval might be the occasion of litigation is .not in itself
sufficient to compel rejection, but here it can result in nothing
but litigation, and that is sufficient.
Regardless of Application No. 12144, the facts found
establish that the waters in question result from an appropriation made from a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved
from wastage into Great Salt Lake; that they have been stored
in a reservoir constructed to receive and conserve them; that
they have been reduced to actual possession by the United States
as an essential part of the water supply of a great reclamation
project. In practical effect, they have been creat~d. Are these
facts of any legal consequence? Are these waters, having once
been used, now subject to appropriation by a stranger without
a showing or attempt to show that they have been abandoned
by those responsible for their existence? Respondents urge that
by .some hocus pocus this question be left unanswered.
If those facts are of no legal effect noticeable on application to appropriate the waters so realized, how can this court
avoid saying so? And if they are--if under those facts those
waters are not subject to appropriation without showing of
abandonment by their creator, how can this court avoid saying
that?
Except for the fact and effect of Application No. 12144,
there is in this case nothing but that question worthy of any
time or space whatever; and we regret the long and obstaclestrewn road necessary to reach it. This. is the question .in aid of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

64
which we referred the court to Ide vs. United States and United
States vs. Haga, in our original brief, pages 16-18 as to the
former, and pages 22-23 as to the latter.
In Ide vs. United States, the controversy was between
parties who, upon application to the State Engineer, had received permission to perfect an appropriation of the seepage
waters, on one side, and the United States whose construction
and operation of the Shoshone Project had produced them, on
the other. That is to say, the same controversy that would inevitably ensue between Jones and the United States if the Jones
applications were approved. The court said-and this is its
decision-·· ... the artificial flow was not available, because the
plaintiff (United States) was entitled and intending to use it.
The asserted appropr~ations, therefore, derive no support from
the permits.'' And so, as here, their granting produced, and
could produce, nothing except litigation.
The court held, on a claim of abandonment by the United
States, that there had been none, adding, ··As making against
this conclusion, the defendants say that the plaintiff, in 1910,
applied to the state engineer for a permit authorizing it to
divert water from the ravine for the irrigation of particular
lands, and that the application was returned without approval.
But we find no evidence of abandonment in this. If the application shows anything material in this connection, it is that the
plaintiff was then intending to divert and use the seepage.
The reason given by the state engineer for returning the application without approval was that the irrigation of the particular
lands was "already covered" by the plaintiff's existing permit.
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Certainly nothing \Vas lost by the application or by the engineer· s action thereon.''
A similar, though not quite identical, argument is n1ade
in the Reply of Respondent Jones. We quote from page 23.
"And of course, the Government must have considered its filing
No. 12144 to be on unappropriated water, and on water, according to the previous argument as to the statutes (A. 10),
\vhich the Engineer must have found were unappropriated
waters before approving this application. Then, if these waters
were unappropriated and subject to this lower filing by the
Government itself, how can Amicus Curiae, speaking here for
the Government, contend as against us that the same waters
were already appropriated by the Weber River filing. The
Government's actions do not conform with the assertions of
its spokesman."
We might answer this in the language of the Supreme
Court: ·1f the application shows anything material in this
connection, it is that the United States was then intending to
divert and use the seepage. Certainly nothing was lost by the
application or the engineers' action thereon."
The general principles underlying the decisions-Ide vs.
United States and United States vs. Haga-are so coge·nt and
compelling and so appropriate, that we repeat them in part
from the opinions ... In point of law the general principle upon
which the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy; one
\vho by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is
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able and willing to apply it to beneficial uses, and such right
extends to what is commonly known as wastage from surface
run-off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical
irrigation. ,Considerations of both public policy and natural
justice strongly support such a rule."

.

It 1nay be noticed that neither Respondent makes any
attempt vvhatever to question either the result or the reasoning
of these cases. The Attorney General fails to so much as touch
them, and Respondent Jones' Reply does not mention them except to say the actions were of a different character.
In his original brief, Respondent Jones did not refer to
United States vs. Haga at all, but sought to distinguish Ide vs.
United States on the facts. Our comments upon .the attempt as
to the facts begins with the last paragraph of page 18 of our
original brief, and continues to page 21. Of course the actions
were of different character. The cases are cited, as we have
stated again and again, to the end of determining that the
waters the right to appropriate which is sought by Jones are
not the subject of appropriation by him, and so that there is no
unappropriated water in the proposed source, and that the
proposed use would impair existing rights, and so that it is
inzprobable to the utmost degree that the right sought could ever
be perfected.
Suppose that what was said by the Federal Court and by the
Supreme Court of the United States ((In point of law the general principle upon which the plaintiff relies is scarcely open
to controversy; one who by the expenditure of money and labor
diverts appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it
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available for fruitful purposes; is entitled to its erclusive control so long as he is able and willing to apply it to beneficial
uses, and such right extends to \V hat is common! y known as
\vastage from surface run-off and deep percolation, necessarily
incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both public
policy and natural justice strongly support such a rule." had
been said by the Supreme Court of Utah; would Jones' Counsel
say: (tyes, but that was said in an action of different form!"
We hope not.
If Respondents had argued that what we have quoted \vas
pure dictum or that the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court "'ere unsound, and that this court ought not to agree, the
argument, however unreasonable, would at least be understandable.
Now the argument made (Jones Reply, page 23) is the
one we have already touched upon, viz.: ttAnd of course, the
Government must have considered its filing No. 12144 to be
an unappropriated water, and on water, according to the previous argument as to the statutes (A. 10), which the Engineer
must have found were unappropriated waters before approving
this application. Then, if these waters were unappropriated and
subject to this lower filing by the Government itself, how can
Amicus Curiae, speaking for the Government, contend as
against us that the same waters were already appropriated by
the Weber River filing. The Government's actions do not conform with the assertions of its spokesman.''
The answer of the Supreme Court of the United States in
similar situation, we have given under this same quotation a
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page or so above; but that answer, however sufficient, is scarcely
as pointedly decisive as the one about to appear below.
((And of course,'' it is said, t(the Government must have
considered its filing No. 12144 to be an unappropriated
water . . . " EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE; the
making of application 12144 was an affirmance by the United
States that the right to the use of the seepage waters (ta result
of the construction and operation of the Deer Creek Reservoir"
belonged to it-that those waters were NOT unappropriated.
tt ... and on water, according to previous argument as
to the statutes (A. 10) which the Engineer must have found
were unappropriated waters before approving this application."
EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE. Before, and as a
prerequisite to his approval of Application No. 12144, the
State Engineer must have found the right to the use of the
seepage and return flow to accrue from ttthe construction and
operation of Deer Creek Reservoir" vested in the Applicant,
the United States of America.
tt . . . Then, if these waters were unappropriated and
subject to this lower filing by the Government itself, how can
Amicus Curire, speaking here for the Government, contend as
against us that the same waters were already appropriated
by the Weber River filing . . ."
But, as we have said, ttthese waters" the subject of the
Government's Application No. 12144, were not unappro~
priated, and the very fact of the filing of Application No.
12144 asserted that they were not. That application asserted
them to have been, or that when they accrued from the con~
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struction and operation of the Deer Creek reservoir, they would
be already appropriated. That is to say, as early as April 3,
1936, the United States gave public notice of its intention to
recapture and re-store and reuse the seepage to accrue from
the construction and operation of Deer Creek Reservoir, among
\vhich are the waters-now identified as such-the subject
of the Jones Application; and, in doing so, it then did the
very opposite of that which Respondent mistakenly infers.
Just as soldiers, faced with the anxieties of combat, frequently develop all sorts of disabling infirmities, so the zeal
of counsel for Respondent has ieveloped a psychological
((blind spot."

Application No. 12144 is not an Application to APPROPRIATE at all. It is an application to store and EXCHANGE
waters already appropriated-as the application itself expressly
states-rrWaters belonging to the United States which will
flow into and augment the water supply of Utah Lake as a
result of the construction and operation of Deer Creek Reservoir."
The application was made pursuant to the provisions of
Section 20, Chapter 3, Title 100, entitled, (CRight to Convey
Appropriated Waters Into Natural Streams and to Impound."
It reads in part: cc • • • upon application in writing and approval
of ~e State Engineer, any appropriated water may ... " etc., etc.
Counsel has not noticed the language used in referring
to this _Application in our original brief, (page 31). CCBy this
application the United States confirmed its right to recapture;
and it declared its intention to recapture, waters accruing to
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Utah Lake by the 'seepage and return flow' of waters stored
in and used from the Deer Creek Reservoir and to exchange
them for direct flow rights in the Provo River." "The rights
of the United States confirmed by this Application are vital
to the water supply of the Provo River Project."
The Application expressly alleged that the waters proposed
to be exchanged were already appropriated-more than that
even-that they belonged to the United States,-an expression
fully permissible under the circumstances.
Approval of the Application necessarily involved a determination by the State Engineer that the right to the use of the
waters the subject of th~ Application belonged to the United
States; and such a determination was also implicit in the
decision of the State Engineer, the decision of the District
Court and in the decision of this court in Tanner vs. Bacon
State Engineer, 103 Utah, 394, for prerequisite to the right of
exchange is the right to use the waters exchanged.
The result is that the principles, the foundation of the
decisions of Ide vs. United States and United States vs. Haga,
sufficient in themselves to affirm the rights of the United
States totally irreconcilable with approval of the Jones Applications, have long since been affirmed by the State Engineer
and by this court. And why not? Who will deny that the
result was directed by rr considerations of both public policy
and natural justice.n
Is it probable that there is unappropriated water in the
proposed source, or that the proposed use will not impair
existing rights? Is it probable that the Jones Applications
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can be perfected? Is it not true that their approval could have
no other result than litigation, the necessity for which may
be obviated by the rejection in1pelled by the facts?
In his Reply, Respondent Jones is driven to the desperate
expediant of urging that the District Court did not find that all
of the 'vaters involved were the result of the use of Deer Creek
storage, but only rrsubstantially all," and to assert that some
accrued as early as 1913, referring to the transcript.
We have not examined the testimony, for the all sufficient reason that it is not open to us, any more than it is open
to Appellant or Respondent to question the findings of fact
of the trial court. The facts of this case are those found.
The findings in each of the three consolidated casse are
identical except as to the rate of flow, which in one case is (~7
cubic feet per second-for irrigation"; in another, (~6 cubic
feet per second-for irrigation"; and in the other, (: 5 cubic
feet per second-for irrigation."
rrsuch water (in each case) ((is from increased flow in a

spring and spring area due to increased seepage from an enlarged canal and extensive increased irrigation at higher levels
from waters stored at Deer Creek Reservoir on the Provo River,
and which waters so used and so seeping and arising in defendant's land are substantially all waters diverted from Weber
River Irrigation System to the Provo River and to Deer Creek
Reservoir." (Finding No. 6.)
rryhe waters thus and here involved" (in each case) have

arisen during approximately the last three years ... " (Finding
No.7).
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There is no finding of the existence of any increased flow
except ccfrotn waters stored at Deer Creek Reservoir," or any
arising except during ccapproximately the last three years."
It is hardly possible, we think, for this court to say that the
applicant may now proceed in accord with the statute c:to take
all steps required to apply the water to the use named and to
perfect the proposed appropriation''-" except as to substantially all of the said waters.n ctSubstantially all" in its context
of finding No. 6 must mean ccall of any consequence."
In our original brief we gave it as our opinion that the
Provo River Project of the United States Bureau of Reclamation
is judicially known, and commencing on page 25 and continuing
to include page 28, we gave our reasons. Nothing said up to
this point is dependept upon the validity of the opinion there
expressed and supported, for our conclusions from it stated
beginning at page 28 of our first brief, add very little to the
more than fifty references to Deer Creek, its enlarged canal,
its reservoir, its Weber diversions, and its general plan supplied
by Court and Counsel at the trial, in the findings and by the
original briefs of both Appellant and Respondent. In regard
to this last, we are unable to resist mention of the naive statement of Counsel that his rather detailed account of the real
facts of Deer Creek was only for the purpose of showing that
the facts of Ide vs. United States were different.
Nevertheless, and important or not, we are still of the
opinion formerly expressed. The Special Assistant Attorney
General has little if anything to say of the matter, agreeing
rather, as it seems to us, but urging that in no event ought
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any consideration to be given to the facts relative to the Pr?ject
however disclosed. Counsel for Respondent Jones, however,
disagrees entirely and cites a half dozen or so authorities said
to be opposed. We have not looked into them, being content
with the general statement of one of them as given by him.
"In other words, judicial knowledge is measured by general
knowledge of the same facts." We have seen this expressed
elsev.rhere as t(The court knows what everyone else knows."
Without pretending to any expertness in this field, we
hope we may still give our view on what ought to be. It seems
to us that the judicial knowledge of the Supreme Court of
Utah, while. comprehending a great deal that is known to the
courts of other jurisdictions, also includes a great deal that is
peculiar to Utah, and it seems to us that, in addition to much
else, it ought to include that which for considerably more
than a quarter of a century has. been the subject of official
solicitude of the State of Utah-of the Provo River Project
of which there could be said in the year 1943 what was said
of it by Mr. Justice Wade in Tanner vs. Bacon, State Engineer,
commencing at page 501 of 103 Utah, and by Mr. Justice Wolf
at page 511; the latter saying something especially appropriate
to the merits of this case:
"Suffice it to say in this case that the Deer Creek
Project reached a point in conception and realization
where it could definitely be said to be against public
interest to affirm any application which would interfere
with its fruition.''
A Project of such vital significance to the State of Utah that,
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as the court held, interference with its water right under Application No. 12144, basicly deriving from its Weber River
rights, \vas detrimental to the public welfare, even as against
a filing made eleven years before. Most of its water rights
were initiated by the State itself, and were passed to it by
special act of its legislature.
In our original brief, at page 27, we said, ('in point of
expenditure of money, of effort, of engineering works, and
of benefits, the Provo River Project is the greatest public
enterprise so far undertaken in the State of Utah'' and we
might properly have added, "and by the State of Utah." We
also stated the fact (page 26) that various reports-official
documents of the State and of the United States--concerning
it were given to the public on three separate occasions.
All in all, it seems to us that its public character alone
compels Judicial knowledge of it. As to the nature and extent
of this we invite attention to our original brief pages 25 to 27.
In addition, there is the fact that for many years the
project has been the subject of a publicity in the public press,
broader in scope, more detailed, and more persistent than any
other enterprise, public or private has ever received in the
State of Utah. It commenced many years ago with the commencement of public and official interest, and has continued,
scarcely unabated in intensity to this day. The effect can hardly
be better exemplified than it is in the mere fact of Finding
No. 6 of this cause.
Is it possible that this court, as such, does not know of
the existence of the pfi-vate enterprise known as the Utah
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Copper Mine, that it is the largest open cut copper mine 1n
North America, that it produces a large tonnage of low grade
ore, and even that its ores are refined by what is known as the
flotation process? (CEveryone else" in the State of Utah
knows these things; but of the Provo River Project everyone
is reminded almost every day, and a large proportion of the
State's population is affected by it, and the welfare-aln1ost
the continued existence-of its capital city is dependent upon it.
Permit us to state once more the principles of law which,
as we see it, are controlling in this case, and a barest outline
of the facts the effect of which they will ndetermine."
Applications to appropriate certain alleged unappropropriated public waters of the State of Utah were filed with
the State Engineer. The State Engineer was thereupon ( required to determine whether there" was ((unappropriated water
t

in the proposed source of supply and whether the water sought
to be appropriated" could ((be put to beneficial use and" could
((be diverted from the source of supply without doing material
injury to the prior rights of others" Section 8, Chapter 3,
Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943; Eardley vs. Terry.
The Application, having been disposed of by the State
Engineer, was brought before the District Court under Section
14 of Chapter 3. Thereupon the District Court was ((required
to determine the same questions de novo.''
If it ((appeared to the" District Court (Cthat there" was
ccunappropriated water which the applicant" sought ((to appropriate and which he" could ((beneficially use without
injury to or conflict with the prior rights of others, then the
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application should" have been ''approved ·by the court;''
"otherwise it should" have been ((rejected."
The facts found by the District Court, ((establish that
the waters in question result from an appropriation made from
a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved from wastage
into Great Salt Lake; that they have been stored in a reservoir
constructed to receive and conserve them; that they have been
1'educed to actual possession by the United States as an essential
part of the v1ater supply of a great reclamation project. In
practical effect, they have been created. Are these facts of
any legal consequence? Are these waters, having been once
used, now subject to appropriation by a stranger without a
showing or attempt to show that they have been abandoned
by those responsible for their existence?'~
There is no other issue in this case except that; and, its
"determination" it seems to us, is logically .impelled by the
reasoning of Ide vs. United States and United States vs. Haga:
" 'In point of lavv the general principle upon which
the plaintiff relies is scarcely open to controversy; one
who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts
appropriable water from a stream, and thus makes it
available for fruitful purposes, is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to
apply it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to
what is commonly known as wastage from surface runoff and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and
natural justice strongly support such a rule. Nor is it
essential to his control that the appropriator maintain
continuous actual possession of such water. So long
as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to use,
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he may assert his rights. It is not necessary that he
confine it upon his own land or convey it in an artificial
conduit. It is requisite, of course, that he be able to
identify it; but, subject to that limitation, he may conduct it through natural channels and may even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters.
In short, the rights of an appropriator in these respects
are not affected by the fact that the water has once
been used.' "

Respectfully submitted,
FISHER HARRIS
Amicus Curiae
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